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A COMPARISON OF INSIDER LIABILITY UNDER
DIAMOND v. OREAMUNO AND FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
The use of information not generally available to the public by
corporate officers and directors in their personal transactions in the
securities of their corporation is generally regulated by federal stat-
ute.' In Diamond v. Oreamuno 2 however, the New York Court of Ap-
peals sustained, on the basis of agency law, a shareholder's derivative
complaint brought to recover the profits realized by the president and
the chairman of the board of directors from the sale of securities of
their corporation transacted on the basis of nonpublic information.'
This comment will analyze the cause of action recognized in Diamond
and compare it with the federal cause of action created by Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' to determine which
action provides the more effective approach for a potential plaintiff.
1
 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § lOb, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964), provides in
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or any facility
of any national securities exchange—
(a) . . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so reg-
istered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Pursuant to the above authorization the Securities Exchange Commission established
rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements mad; in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
2
 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E,2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
3 Throughout this comment the terms confidential information, inside information,
nondisclosed information, and nonpublic information are used interchangeably to denote
knowledge of facts or circumstances other than what is considered general business
knowledge.
4 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964), provides
in part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his rela-
tionship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale,
or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer . . . within
any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be re-
coverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such ben-
eficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the
security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding
six months . . . .
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The proper party to bring a rule 10b-5 5 action in cases such as Dia-
mond will be identified, and the possibility of the defendants' double
or triple liability under Diamond, section 16(b) and rule 10b-5 will
be evaluated.
I. THE AGENCY THEORY
In Diamond the president and the chairman of the board of direc-
tors of Management Assistance, Inc. (MAI) sold 56,500 shares of
MAI stock on the basis of their knowledge that the earnings of MAI
for August, 1966, had decreased sharply in comparison with MAI's
earnings for the previous month,' and in comparison with earnings
for the same month in the previous year.' The sale occurred before
the decrease in corporate earnings was publicly disclosed. A share-
holder filed a derivative suit to recover for the corporation the profits
derived by the defendants from the sale of stock. 8
The plaintiff-shareholder argued that the private use of con-
fidential information by officers or directors having access to the in-
formation solely by virtue of their positions with the corporation is a
breach of their fiduciary duty to the corporation. It was further con-
tended by plaintiff that the defendants learned of the information in
the course of their corporate duties and that they were entrusted
with the potentially valuable information for the sole purpose of
carrying on the corporate business. The plaintiff argued that the de-
fendants breached their fiduciary duty when they appropriated the
information for their personal benefit. Their fiduciary duty required
that they act solely in the interest of the corporation with regard to
their use of corporate assets. The New York Supreme Court dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.° The ap-
pellate division reversed the lower court" and the decision of the
appellate division was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New
York."
The holding of the court of appeals in Diamond is based exclu-
sively on principles of agency law.' The court found that the de-
fendants were agents of the corporation and had learned of the
5 See note 1 supra,
6 24 N.Y.2d at 497, 248 N.E.2d at 911, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
7
 Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 286, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (1968).
8 The defendants received $28 per share of stock. The market price of the stock
fell to $11 per share after the information was disclosed several months later. 24 N.Y.2d
at 497, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80. The difference between the price per
share that the defendants received and the price they would have realized had the infor-
mation been disclosed, arguably $17 per share, is the profit the corporation is seeking
to recover.
9 Judge GoId's decision was not reported.
10 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1968).
11 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
12
 The court based its opinion on a prior New York agency case, Byrne v. Barrett,




decrease in earnings in the course of their corporate duties. The court
held that an agent entrusted with information for the purpose of
carrying on his principal's business may use the information for that
purpose only. An agent who exploits, for his own benefit, knowledge
or information acquired by virtue of a fiduciary relationship must ac-
count to his principal for any profits he derives therefrom." Thus, in
rejecting the defendants' arguments that injury to the corporation
must be shown, the court held that an agent deriving profits from
the personal use of such information must account for them to the
corporation, even though the personal use of the information causes
no damage to the principal."
The court noted that damage or injury to the corporation as a
result of the defendants' activities could be inferred. The use of non-
public information in securities transactions by corporate officers or
directors casts a cloud upon the reputation of the corporation, under-
mines shareholder relations, destroys public confidence in the securi-
ties of the corporation and generally diminishes the prestige and
good will of the corporation.' The court, however, held that injury
is not a necessary element to a cause of action based upon breach of
a fiduciary duty. The court reasoned that the purpose of such a cause
of action is not merely to provide compensation to an injured party
but to deter agents from attempting to derive personal profits from
the private use of corporate information by eliminating the profit
incentive for such breaches of fiduciary duty." The court observed
that the primary concern in such a case is not to determine whether
the corporation suffered injury but, as between the defendants and
the corporation, who has the higher claim to the profits derived from
the exploitation of the corporate asset. 17
The Diamond decision has been strongly criticized by at least
two other commentators." Their analyses suggest that the case repre-
sents an undesirable departure from prior New York case law and
that the section of the Restatement (Second) of Agency" which was
heavily relied on by the court is an over-generalization and is unsup-
ported by the cases cited in connection with that section. 2° Further-
13 24 N.Y.2d at 497, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
14 Id. at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
15 Id. at 494, 248 N.E.2d at 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
18 Id. at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
17 Id.
18 18 Buffalo L. Rev. 193 (1968) ; 37 Fordham L. Rev. 477 (1968).
18 The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 388, comment c (1957) states in part:
An agent who acquires confidential information in the course of his employ-
ment or in violation of his duties has a duty . . . to account for any profits
made by the use of such information, although this does not harm the prin-
cipal. • . So, if . . . [a corporate officer] has "inside" information that the
corporation is about to purchase or sell securities, or to declare or to pass a
dividend, profits made by him in stock transactions undertaken because of his
knowledge are held in constructive trust for the principal.
20 One commentator further suggested that public policy does not require the estab-
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more, it can be argued that the court should have considered the
rationale of decisions in other jurisdictions which have denied liability
in fact situations similar to Diamond.
Prior to Diamond the limitations placed upon the personal ac-
tivities of corporate officers and directors by their fiduciary obliga- .
tions were never considered by the New York courts to be as broad as
the Diamond holding suggests. Officers and directors have been held
accountable for the profits they derived from usurping a corporate
opportunity. For example, in Averill v. Barber 21
 the defendant directors
had purchased for themselves patents which their corporation required
for it operations. The defendants were held accountable to the corpora-
tion for the patents and all profits realized from their use.
Officers and directors also have been held accountable for all the
profits they derived from personal transactions in which they used a
corporate asset or property. For example, in Marcus v. Otis' direc-
tors were held accountable for the profits derived from the purchase
of stock in another corporation because they had used corporate funds,
which were later repaid, to finance the purchase. Similarly, officers
and directors have been prohibited from engaging in activities which
are in competition which is detrimental to the corporation. In Foley v.
D'Agostino23
 the defendants were directors and 50 percent share-
holders in several related close family corporations which operated
supermarkets under the family name. The court held that the defend-
ants were prohibited from independently operating a rival and com-
peting chain of supermarkets even though the family corporations
had turned down the opportunity to purchase the rival chain from its
previous owner. The court said that officers and directors may not
engage in competing businesses to the detriment of their corpora-
tion. Furthermore, officers and directors have been held accountable
for profits they derive from transactions entered into on behalf of their
corporation where the transactions cause direct injury to the corpora-
tion. In Garden Hill Estates, Inc. v. Bernstein," the president of a
corporation was held accountable to his corporation for the "kick-
backs" he received from a contractor. Officers or directors also may
be held liable for any excessive profits they derive from the sale of a
controlling interest in their corporation. 25
These prior New York cases, many of which involved the use
of inside information by corporate officers and directors, all have an
additional element. None of these cases support the proposition that
lishment of the cause of action recognized in Diamond since the defendants incur liability
under federal securities law and thus their misconduct will not be unchecked. 37 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 477, 480 (1968).
21
 53 Hun 636, 6 N.Y.S. 255 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889).
22 168 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1948).
23
 21 App. Div. 2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1964).
24 24 App. Div. 2d 512, 261 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1965).
28




the use of inside information is per se a breach of fiduciary duty.
Rather, they hold that the particular manner in which the information
is used gives rise to the breach of fiduciary duty, such as where use
of the information amounts to a usurpation of a corporate oppor-
tunity or results in competition with the corporation.
The court in Diamond based its holding in part on Byrne v.
Barrett." In Byrne, however, the defendant agent, in utilizing the
information acquired in the course of his agency, was acting in direct
competition with his principal. The defendant's actions amounted to
a diversion of a business opportunity." Thus, the case is in line with
the prior New York cases which hold that an agent may not use
information acquired in the course of his agency in personal trans-
actions which result in competition detrimental to his principal.
Byrne, however, does not support the position that any use of such
information is per se a breach of the agent's fiduciary duty, and, to
that extent, does not support the holding in Diamond. Byrne is dis-
tinguishable from Diamond in that the defendants in Diamond did not
appropriate a corporate opportunity or compete with the corporation.
It would have been illegal under federal securities law for the corpora-
tion to sell its shares on the basis of the inside information." Thus,
the defendants' actions can not be construed as diverting a corporate
opportunity or competing with the corporation since the corporation
itself was prohibited from engaging in the transaction.
Furthermore, the court did not consider the positions of several
courts in other jurisdictions which have held, contrary to Diamond,
that an officer or director who uses inside information for his own
benefit does not breach his fiduciary duty when the activities engaged
in by the officer or director are ultra vires to the corporation." In
Diedrick v. Helm30
 a loan association required as part of its loan agree-
ments that borrowers carry insurance on their property in favor of
the association. The association was prohibited from engaging in the
insurance business, or receiving commissions on policies covering
property against which it loaned money, according to its by-laws and
a state statute as construed by the Commissioner of Banks. A director
of the association was independently engaged in the insurance business
and his insurance office was located within the offices of the associa-
26
 268 N.Y. 199, 197 N.E. 217 (1935).
2-7 In Byrne an agent resigned from his position as salesman for a real estate broker
during the time he was negotiating the sale of a leasehold. While he was an agent be had
misinformed his principal as to the likelihood of the success of the transaction. Follow-
ing his resignation, the former agent successfully completed the negotiations on his own
behalf. Id. at 244-05, 197 N.E. at 217-18. Thus, although the defendant used information
acquired in the course of his agency, his actions amounted to a diversion of a business
opportunity of his principal.
28
 Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1963).
29
 Annot., 153 A.L.R. 663 (1944) and cases cited therein. The term ulta vires is used
in its broadest sense, i.e., to denote activities which are improper for the corporation
to engage in either because such actions are not authorized by the corporate charter or
by-laws or, as in the present case, the actions are otherwise illegal.
30 217 Minn. 483, 14 N.W.2d 913 (1944).
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tion. The director used his knowledge of applicants of the association
as a source of clients for his insurance business. The Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the profits derived from the use of that
information were not accountable to the association. The court rea-
soned that the association had no interest, expectancy or opportunity
to derive profits from the sale of insurance to its clients, and that the
director could appropriate the information to sell insurance without
incurring any liability to the association."
Another court reached a similar result in Thilco Timber Co. v.
Sawyer." There, two directors of a corporation were engaged in
the business of buying tax titles to property. They purchased the
tax title to property of which their corporation and another party
were co-tenants. The corporation was legally prohibited from pur-
chasing the tax title to property of which it was a co-tenant."
The directors learned of the tax sale in the course of their corporate
duties but the Supreme Court of Michigan held that they could make
personal use of the information without incurring any liability to their
corporation. Contrary to the holding in Diamond, it was held that an
officer or director does not per se breach his fiduciary duty if he
appropriates for his own use information acquired in the course of
his duties."
The Diamond decision has also been criticized for its reliance on
comment c of Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency."
Although the comment, cited by the court," directly supports its
holding, the cases cited in connection with the section do not fully
support the broad generalization stated in the comment. The cases
cited in connection with section 388 involve a variety of situations
in which an agent derived personal profit from a transaction which
he undertook on behalf of his principal. In Savage v. Mayer," an
agent who had represented the cost of securities he purchased for
his principal to be greater than they actually were, was held account-
81 Id. at 499, 14 N.W.2d at 922.
32 236 Mich. 401, 210 N.W. 204 (1926).
33 Id. at 404, 210 N.W. at 205.
34 In Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S.E. 678 (1931), the corpora-
tion was engaged in the business of drilling for oil and gas. The directors of the corpo-
ration were informed by the United States Land Department that a corporation or a
person could only purchase one 20-acre tract in an area in which the corporation sought
to explore for oil. In light of this limitation the directors each purchased one 20-acre
tract for themselves as well as one 20-acre tract for the corporation. The court required
the directors to account to the other shareholders for the profits they derived from their
tracts. The court stated that the directors had a duty to make full disclosure of the
information to the shareholders so that they might have the opportunity to apply for
those lands themselves. The court stated that the defendants' rights as directors were no
greater than the other shareholders'. Diamond is distinguishable in that the defendants'
transactions were illegal, and thus the shareholders would have had no opportunity to
sell their shares if they were told of the inside information and the public was not.
35 37 Fordham L. Rev. 477, 479 (1968). See note 19 supra for text of comment c.
86 24 N.Y.2d at 501, 248 N.E.2d at 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
37 33 Cal. 2d 548, 203 P.2d 9 (1949).
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able for the excess amount he had charged his principal. Similarly,
in Blackburn's Admix v. Union Bank & Trust Co.," an agent of
a bank who charged borrowers a service charge for examining titles
and preparing mortgages in the name of the bank and retained
the profits for himself, was held accountable to the bank for the
profits he realized. These cases involve situations in which an agent
made personal profits, other than salary or commissions paid by the
principal, on transactions conducted by the agent on behalf of his
principal. They are thus distinguishable from Diamond where the
defendants were not engaged in transactions on behalf of the corpora-
tion, and they do not support the broad statement of comment c that
an agent must account for profits derived by him from any use of
confidential information.
Although the court did not refer to Section 395 of the Restate-
ment," that section is cited in comment c of section 388. Section 395
contains the same prohibition stated in comment c with regard to
an agent's duty to account for profits he derives from the personal
use of confidential information acquired in the course of his agency.
However, the cases cited in connection with section 395 also do
not support the broad generalization made by the Restatement. In
Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Cox," an agent was prohibited
from disclosing his former employer's secret process to a competitor.
And in Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Pratt," a geologist was held to have
breached his fiduciary duty when he purchased an interest in lands
which he had evaluated for the company. In Junker v. Plummer,42
former employees were prohibited from duplicating their employer's
unique machinery and using it for their own advantage and to the
harm of their past employer. In these cases the finding of a breach of
fiduciary duty is based upon more than the fact that the agent used
confidential information. In each case the use of the information
constituted competition with the principal or usurpation of a business
opportunity or caused injury to the principal. The cases do not support
the position that any use of confidential information is per se a breach
of fiduciary duty. The Restatement's position must be considered to
be an over-generalization.
Even though the broad holding of Diamond that an officer or
director per se breaches his fiduciary duty by the use of confidential
information acquired in the course of his duties is in error, it is sub-
mitted that the result reached by the court is correct. It is suggested
28
 269 Ky. 699, 108 S.W.2d 806 (1937).
89
 The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395 (1957) states in part:
[Ain agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to use or communicate
information . . . acquired by him during the course of or on account of his
agency . . . on his own account or on behalf of another. . . .
40 50 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
41
 22 F. Supp. 304 (D.C. Kan. 1938), aff'd, 100 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 306 U.S. 659 (1938).
42
 320 Mass. 76, 67 N.E.2d 667 (1946).
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that the defendants in Ditiniond breached their fiduciary duties, and
thuS are liable for their profits, by placing their personal interests
in conflict with the interests of their corporation." When the de-
fendants, on the basis of nonpublic information, sold securities of
their corporation, they Were acting in their own interests for their own
benefit. Defendants' activities created at least potential if not actual
injury to the corporation." The court implicitly recognized this Con-
flict of interest when it stated that it could be inferred that the de-
fendants' transactions resulted in injury to the reputation, good will
and image of the corporation." It was the particular manner in which
the defendants in Diamond used the information which created the
conflict between the defendants' financial interests and the interest of
the corporation. This conflict of interest, created by the potential for
injury to the corporation, constituted the defendants' breach Of their
fiduciary duty.
Diamond is distinguishable ftoin the Thilco line of cases cited
earlier in which the courts held that corporate officers and directors
do not breach their fiduciary duty when they apptopriate inside in-
formation for their own use if the manner in which the information is
used is ultra vires to the corporation. Diamond may be distinguished
because there the use of the information by the defendants created a
conflict of interest and the possibility of injury to the corporation,
and because the actions of the officer and director were otherwise
illegal and generally contrary to the public policy favoring fair comL
petition in the securities marketplace." It is the illegality of the de-
fendants' actions in Diamond, a factor not present in the Thilco line
of cases, with the resulting adverse impact upon the corporation of
which defendants were president and chairman of the board of direc-
tors, that created the conflict of interest. The defendants' activities in
the Thilco line of cases were not otherwise illegal or contrary to
public policy, and therefore there was no adverse effect on their
corporation and no conflict of interest. Thus, in situations such as
DiamOnd, officers and directorS breach their fiduciary duty when they
use inside information in an illegal manner for personal profit be-
cause they at least risk (if not cause) injury to their corporation.
Therefore, as the court stated, the profits they derive from those
43
 "The fundamental question in each case is whether the officer or director of a
corporation has permitted his self-interest to conflict with the interests of the corpora-
tion." Diedrick v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 494, 14 N.W.2d 913, 919 (1944).
44 The injuries which the Diamond court called inferable can necessari13 ,
 only accrue
when the defendants' transactions have been made public and not before then.
44 24 N.Y.2d at 499, 248 N.E.2d at 912-13, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82.
46 The Sectirities Exehange Act of 1934 t '2, 15 U.S.C.	 78b (1964), provides in
part:
For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as coin-
monly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are
effected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to proiride for




transactions should be accountable to the corporation as the best means
of deterring such actions.
IL AGENCY LAW AND SECTION 16(b)
As was indicated earlier, the defendants' activities in Diamond
are subject not only to state proscription under traditional agency
law theory, but also to federal control under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 47 Furthermore, had the defendants
in Diamond purchased and sold their securities within a six-month
period, the plaintiff could have brought an action under Section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Section 16(b) prohibits the
retention of short-swing profits resulting from the purchase and sale
or sale and purchase of securities of a corporation within a six-month
period by officers, directors or 10 percent shareholders of the corpora-
tion. Under section 16(b) proof of actual use or knowledge of inside
information is not required," and the corporation may recover the
insider's profits resulting from the prohibited transactions.
Comparing the cause of action under agency principles with the
federal cause of action created under section 16(b), it is obvious that
the agency action is applicable to a wider variety of situations. Any
agent of a corporation may be liable under agency principles for
engaging in transactions in the securities of his corporation on the basis
of inside information. Under section 16(b) only officers, directors and
10 percent shareholders are liable for engaging in the prohibited trans-
actions. Moreover, an officer, director or 10 percent shareholder is
not liable under section 16(b), even when his transactions are based
on inside information, if he holds the securities for six months."
Also, to obtain corporate recovery under section 16(b) it is necessary
to show both the purchase and sale or a sale and purchase of the securi-
ties by the defendant, whereas under the agency theory a single trans-
action in the securities of the corporation is sufficient to establish
liability.
Acknowledging the differences between the agency action and
the section 16(b) action, a situation could arise in which an officer
or director of a corporation might be subject to liability under both
agency principles and section 16(b). The plaintiff must weigh a
variety of factors to determine which approach offers the greater
likelihood of success. The major difficulty faced by the plaintiff in an
agency action is proof of the defendant's knowledge and use of inside
information. Section 16(b), however, does not require such proof. On
the other hand, under agency theory the plaintiff need only prove
that the defendant was an agent of the corporation at the time of the
transaction, whereas a section 16(b) plaintiff must specifically prove
97 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964). See note 1 supra.
15 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). See note 3 supra.
99 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1041 (2d ed. 1961).
50 Id. at 1042.
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that the defendant was an officer, director or 10 percent shareholder.
Thus, where it is unclear whether the defendant meets the status re-
quirements of section 16(b), it might be advisable to proceed with
an agency action if the defendant is an agent of the corporation.
The section 16(b) plaintiff also must show that both the acquisi-
tion and the disposition of shares by the defendant constituted a
purchase and sale under the Act. Certain transactions, such as a pur-
chase of shares in conjunction with an approved stock option plan,
are exempt from section 16(b). 5 ' Under agency theory the plaintiff
need only show a single transaction which was based upon the use of
inside information. Also, in an agency action the plaintiff is not
restricted by the six-month limitation which is operative under section
16(b). Thus, while section 16(b) presents a relatively unambiguous,
objective test for the determination of liability, the scope of the sec-
tion is limited to a narrower category of individuals and situations than
the agency cause of action. The agency action, although it is applicable
to a greater number of individuals and situations, presents a more
difficult burden of proof, since it involves the proof of subjective fac-
tors in order to establish liability.
Aside from these substantive issues, certain procedural considera-
tions might be relevant to a potential plaintiff's choice as to which suit
to bring. A section 16(b) action would be brought in a federal court,"
whereas the agency suit may have to be brought in a state court."
Procedural differences between these forums might dictate the choice
of action. Of special concern might be the statute of limitations
for each action. The statute of limitations for a section 16(b) action
is two years," whereas the statute of limitations under agency law,
which varies from state to state, may be longer than two years."
Perhaps the most important procedural considerations relate to the
rules regulating shareholders' derivative suits." A plaintiff bringing a
n These exemptions are set forth in 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16b-1 to -11 (1968).
52 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964), provides
in part:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all
suits in equity and actions at law • . „
63 The agency law claim is a cause of action created by state law and would be
brought in a state court unless the suit was removed to a federal court on the grounds
of diversity or of pendant jurisdiction in conjunction with a § 16(b) action brought by
the plaintiffs in addition to the agency suit.
64 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964) provides in part: [N]o suit shall be brought more
than two years after the date . . • [defendant's] profit was realized.
56 In New York, for example, the statute of limitations for the agency action is 6
years. N.Y. Civil Prac. Law § 213 (McKinney 1963).
66 Both the Diamond agency cause of action and the § 16(b) action can be brought
by the corporation itself. Since the suit in Diamond was brought by a shareholder it is
obvious that the law allows a derivative action by shareholders in that situation. Under
§ 16(b) the shareholder may sue the defendants on behalf of the corporation, but this is
not a true derivative action since it is a right granted to them by the statute and not a
right they acquire in relation to the existence of a corporate right. Blau v. Oppenheim,
508
INSIDER LIABILITY
derivative suit in a state court may be required to post security for the
suit," whereas a shareholder suing under section 16(b) in a federal
court is not required to post security for the suit." In addition, the
jurisdiction and venue provisions operative in a section 16(b) suit in
a federal court are very broad." Any of these differences may dictate
that the plaintiff utilize section 16(b) when its objective requirements
have been met.
Thus, if an officer, director or 10 percent shareholder purchases
and sells securities in his corporation within a six-month period,
section 16(b) is generally the better approach to utilize since it in-
volves an objective determination as to the defendant's liability and
the procedural regulations may be more favorable in a federal court.
However, the agency approach may be preferable in situations where
the plaintiff is unsure whether the objective requirements of section
16(b) have been met. Of course, the agency action represents the only
approach when the defendant is an agent but not an officer, director or
10 percent shareholder of the corporation, or when any of the objective
requirements of section 16 (b) have not been met.
The concurrent existence of federal and state causes of action
applicable to the same transaction raises the possibility of double re-
covery by the corporation. It is submitted that the corporation should
not recover twice the amount of profits realized by the defendants,
regardless of which action is brought first or whether both are raised
simultaneously in a federal court."
If a section 16(b) action is brought subsequent to a successful
agency suit in which the corporation has been awarded the defendant's
profits, then recovery under section 16(b) by the corporation is barred
by Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 61 which
limits the total amount recoverable by any person in an action under
[1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 91,630, at 95,349 (S.D.N.Y., Feb.
21, 1966).
57
 For example, in New York a plaintiff bringing a derivative action may have to
post reasonable security for expenses, including attorney's fees, if his holdings of corporate
stock do not amount to 5% of any class of stock or a beneficial interest in such amount
or have a fair market value of less than $50,000. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 627 (McKinney
1963).
58 Truncale v. Blumberg, [1948-1952 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
§ 90,470 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1949).
58 Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 enables the plaintiff to sue the
defendant in the district court in the jurisdiction in which the violation occurred, or in
any other district in which the defendant can be found or where the defendant transacts
business. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
eo It is possible that the agency claim could be raised simultaneously with a § 16(b)
claim in a federal court under the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction.
61 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1964) provides in part:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no
person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this
chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of a judgment in one or more actions,
a total amount in excess of his actual damages ....
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the Act to the actual damages sustained." Assuming that the term
"actual damages" in section 28(a) is broad enough to encompass any
non-compensatory amount awarded the corporation under section
16(b), then section 28(a) is a bar to such recovery in any section
16(b) action brought subsequent to a successful agency suit. Further-
more, recovery under a section 16(b) action brought subsegnent to a
successful agency action should be denied because section 16(b) only
authorizes recovery of the defendant's "profits." Similarly, such
double recovery should also be barred for the same reasons in an
agency suit brought subsequent to a section 16(b) decision awarding
defendant's profits to the corporation.
Where agency and section 16(b) actions are presented simultane-
ously in a federal court," the court should make findings of fact and
determine the question of liability as to both claims. If the plaintiff
is successful on either of the claims he should be entitled to the de-
fendant's profits. However, if the factual findings sustain liability on
both claims, plaintiff should still only recover defendant's profits and
not twice that amount. The arguments against double recovery out-
lined above should apply in this situation also to bar recovery in
excess of actual damages or defendant's profits.
III. AGENCY LAW AND RUT,E 101?-5
Although the double recovery problem can be easily resolved by
a court in a situation which involves a section 16(b) and an agency
law violation, the problem of double recovery is less easily resolved
where a potential violation of rule 101).5 64 is involved. The court
recognized that a violation of rule 10b-5 existed in Diamond.° 5 The
court stated that there was no doubt that the defendants withheld
material information which formed the basis of their transactions, and
that as corporate insiders who, on the basis of nonpublic material facts,
traded in the securities of their corporation, they violated rule lob-5."
The court, however, avoided any discussion of the effect of a future
finding of liability under rule 10b-5 on the defendants or on the corpora-
tion's present right to recovery of the defendants' profits. The court
noted that no individual or class of individuals had come forward
presenting a rule 101?-5 claim before it or any other court, nor had
the defendants interpleaded any individual or class of individuals to
protect themselves from the possibility of double liability." Thus, the
Diamond court did not have to decide which individuals are proper
rule 10b-5 plaintiffs in such a situation, what effect subsequent rule
62
 Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
68 See note 60 supra.
64 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964). See note 1 supra.
85
 24 N.Y.2d 494, 502, 248 N.E.2d 910, 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 84 (1969).
63 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
67
 24 N.Y.2d at 504, 248 N.E.2d at 915,16. 301 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
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10b-5 liability might have on the present recovery by the corporation,
or the problem of possible double liability of the defendants. 68
Although the Diamond court did not have to decide these issues,
they will eventually have to be resolved." The identification of the
proper rule 1Ob-5 plaintiff is central to the question whether double
recovery should be allowed. The difficulty encountered in determining
the proper rule 10b-5 plaintiff in the Diamond situation stems from the
fact that the securities transactions involved were conducted on the
over-the-counter market, thus making it virtually impossible to de ,
ter/nine the identity of the purchasérs of the shares of stock which
were sold by the defendants. These purchasers are the parties actually
injured by the defendants' securities transactions and are thus the
proper plaintiffs in a rule 10b-5 action. The duty of disclosure imposed
on insiders by rule 10b-5 is applicable whether the transactions are
conducted face-to-face, over a national securities exchange or on the
over-the-counter market."
It is submitted that a careful analysis of the exact duty breached
by the defendants will indicate who is an appropriate rule 10b-5
plaintiff in the Diamond situation. The rule imposes on insiders in
such situations the duty not to trade in the securities of their cor-
poration on the basis of inside information. If the insiders do trade
in those securities, they must first publicly disclose all material in-
formation relative to their transactions." If they cannot or choose
not to make that information public, they must not trade in those
securities." A public statement of the material facts satisfies the
obligation to make all relevant information available to investors."
Thus, the duty that the defendants in Diamond breached was one
which was owed to the entire investing public.
It might be argued that the defendants ought to be held liable for
the losses sustained by all investors who purchased MAI stock during
the period of non-disclosure beginning at the time of the insiders' first
sale of stock. This argument must be rejected since it merely assumes
the necessary causal connection between the duty breached and the
injury suffered." That is, it assumes that if the information had been
68 Id.
69 The Diamond court did take note of the fact that these issues are presently in-
volved in litigation in the federal courts, and that one case, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), is particularly involved with these yet unresolved
questions as to who is the proper rule 10b-5 plaintiff in such a situation and what are
the appropriate remedies.
79
 The purpoSe of rule 10b-5 is to prevent fraud and deceit in connection with the
pUrcilase and sale of securities. The individuals who purchased the shares which the de-
fendanti in Diamond sold on the basis of nonpUblic information were the victims of the
type of fraud and deceit Congress intended to protect against, and are thus the propei'
10b-5 plaintiffs. They would certainly be so if the transaction were conduCted face-to-
face. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968):
71 Id. at 848.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 854:
74 In Kardon v. National Gypsuth CO., 69 F. SuPp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the
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publicly disclosed none of the present buyers would have purchased
MAX securities. This assumption is contrary to practical experience.
At best- it would be valid as to some or most of the investors, but
certainly not to all. Furthermore, the acceptance of this assumption
might well subject the defendants to the possibility of liability for
millions of dollars of damages. Such a tenuous causal connection is
clearly not commensurate with this extensive liability.
This extreme result may be avoided by viewing the duty imposed
by rule 10b-5 as requiring the insider to refrain from trading in the
securities of his corporation on the basis of inside information rather
than as a duty to disclose the information when he does trade. If the
duty created by the rule is so viewed, liability for violation of the duty
is limited to the extent to which the insider does trade in the securities
of his corporation. This view is supported by the fact that non-dis-
closure without trading by the insider imposes no liability upon the
insider for losses sustained by any purchaser of the stock during the
period of non-disclosure." The insider's liability arises only when he
trades in the security on the basis of the non-disclosed information.
Thus, the persons injured by the insider are the persons who purchased
the shares he sold, and not every purchaser of shares during the period
of non-disclosure.
Assuming this to be the correct interpretation of the duty
breached, the problem remains of identifying the purchasers of the
shares sold by the insiders. While precise identification is impossible, at
least the class of individuals purchasing the stock on the day or days
on which the defendants sold their stock may be identified. It would
seem equally as valid to assume that all of these individuals acquired
some of the shares that the defendants sold as to assume that one or
a few of these individuals acquired all of the defendants' shares. If
one accepts the assumption that each of the purchasers acquired some
of the defendants' shares, then it should be presumed that the per-
centage of the defendants' shares acquired by each individual is equal
to the percentage which each individual's daily purchase represents
of the total number of shares purchased on those days." That is,
each individual who purchased shares of MAI stock on the days
court stated that a violation of rule 10b-5 constitutes a tort. Thus the basic tort doctrine,
that in order for liability to exist the defendant's action must have a reasonable causal
connection to the injury suffered by the plaintiff, W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 240
(3d ed. 1964), should apply to a 10b-5 case.
75
 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
76
 For example, if an individual purchased 100 shares of MAI stock on a day on
which the defendants in Diamond sold 1,000 shares and the total number of MAI shares
purchased on that day was 100,000, then the percentage of the defendants' 1,000 shares
that the individual is presumed to have purchased on that day is computed as follows:
100
	 = 1 Jo — the individual purchased 1% of all the shares of MAI stock
100,000	 purchased on that day




on which the defendants sold their stock should be presumed to
have been injured in proportion to the number of shares his purchase
represents of the total traded. Thus, the appropriate remedy for these
rule 10b-5 plaintiffs is a pro rata distribution among them of the
defendants' profits.
If the duty imposed upon the defendants in Diamond by rule
10b-5 is such as to prevent them from trading in the securities of their
corporation on the basis of inside information, their breach of duty is
measurable by the extent to which they did trade in such securities
on the basis of inside information. The injury they caused by the
breach is the profit they derived from the sale of their shares, and the
appropriate remedy is the pro rata distribution of those profits to the
class of individuals who purchased MAI stock on the days on which
the defendants sold their shares.
Having defined the proper parties to bring a rule lOb-5 action in
Diamond and the relief available to them, the final issues to be dis-
cussed are the effect of a subsequent rule 10b-5 decision on a previous
agency or section 16(b) suit in which the corporation was awarded the
defendant's profits, and the effect on a subsequent agency or section
16(b) suit of a previous rule 10b-5 judgment in which the plaintiffs
recovered. It is submitted that the defendants should not incur double
liability under these causes of action, and that the conflict should be
resolved by determining which plaintiff has the higher claim to the
defendants' profits.
As noted earlier, both the agency and the section 16(b) causes of
action prescribe the same remedy—corporate recovery of the de-
fendant's profits. Thus, if the rule lOb-5 suit were settled first, in favor
of the plaintiff, then arguably there would be no profits to be re-
covered in the second suit." The dismissal of an agency or section
16(b) suit which is brought subsequent to a rule I0b-5 suit in which
the plaintiff has been granted relief is not objectionable in light of
the fact that the recovery of those profits by the rule 1013-5 plaintiff
effectuates the policy of the agency and section 16(b) actions in that
it deters deceptive conduct on the part of officers, directors or 10 per-
cent shareholders of a corporation by removing the profit incentive
for such actions. The purposes of the agency and section 16 (b) actions
are effectuated just as well by the rule 10b-5 plaintiff's recovery of
those profits as by the corporation's recovery of them. Furthermore,
since the recovery by the corporation in an agency or section 16(b)
action is primarily for the purpose of deterring specific conduct on
the part of certain individuals, rather than for compensating an injured
party, the dismissal of the subsequent agency or section 16 (b) action
does not deny an injured party compensation for damages suffered."
77 See p. 510 supra.
78 The recovery of the defendants' profits is in no way a measure of the damages
suffered by the corporation in a Diamond situation. Section 16(b) is expressly a deterrent
provision. Similarly the Diamond cause of action is based upon a deterrent policy. 24
N.Y.2d at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
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There seems to be no reason for not barring subsequent agency or
section 16(b) recovery by a corporation when a rule 10b-5 plaintiff
has already effectuated the goals of those provisions.
A more difficult problem exists where the corporation has pre,
viously recovered the defendant's profits in an agency or section 16(b)
suit and subsequently a rule 10b-5 action is brought in which the
plaintiff establishes his claim. Holding the defendant liable for both
claims is unacceptable since he would only be liable for one claim
if the suits had been instituted or settled in reverse order. It is, of
course, equally unacceptable to deny a 10b-5 plaintiff's claim since his
claim represents the actual losses he suffered as a result of the de-
fendant's transactions. It is submitted the rule 10b-5 plaintiff has a
higher claim to the defendant's profits than the corporation, because
those profits represent the rule 10b-5 plaintiff's actual losses whereas
the corporation is only awarded the profits so as to deter similar
insider transactions. 79 If one accepts the premise that a rule 10b-5
claim represents a superior claim to the defendant's profits than the
corporation's claim under agency law or section 16 (b), then where the
corporation has previously recovered under agency law or section
16(b), a rule 101Y-5 plaintiff who has successfully brought suit against
the defendant should be allowed to reach his proportion of the profits
recovered by the corporation by order of the court.'
To facilitate the future recovery of rule 10b-5 plaintiffs in the
Diamond situation, the court in which the agency or section 16(b) suit
is being litigated, if it finds that actions under rule 10b-5 may be
commenced, should award defendant's profits to the corporation on
the condition that they be held in trust subject to the claims of any
future rule 10b-5 plaintiff who successfully establishes his claim in a
federal court." If no rule lob-5 actions are commenced within the
78 The proposition that the rule 10b-5 claim is superior to the agency or 	 16(b)
claim was recognized and supported by the Diamond court. In discussing the possibility of
double liability the court stated: "It is not unusual for an action to be brought to recover
a fund which may be subject to a superior claim by a third party." 24 N.Y.2d at 504,
248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
80 Up to this point it has been argued that the corporation recovers the defendant's
profits purely as a deterrent measure to eliminate the incentive for breaches of fiduciary
duty. It was this deterrent character of the award which supports the position that the
10b-5 claim is superior in that it is compensatory in character. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the agent's breach of his fiduciary duties may indeed result in injury to the
corporation and, in that case, the corporation should be allowed to recover for any
specific injuries it sustains completely apart from its recovery of the defendant's profits.
8 1 The trust award suggested in the present case, of limited life and for the benefit
of a class of potential rule 106-5 plaintiffs, is analogous to the traditional constructive
trusts created as a remedy in equity where traditional forms of relief are unavailable.
Osin v. Johnson, 243 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The basic difference between the tradi-
tional constructive trust and the trust suggested in the present case is that in the former
the trust is usually imposed upon a wrongdoer who will be unjustly enriched if allowed
to keep the corpus of the trust. Id. Although the corporation in the present case is not
a wrongdoer, it would be unfair and unjust to allow its recovery to bar the rule 10b-5
plaintiffs' recovery in light of the superior nature of the hitters' claim.
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Period provided fot by the applicable statute of Iiinitatioris , then the
corporation should take full title to the funds. If a rifle lOb-5 suit were
brought within that time, then the duration of the trust should auto-
matically be extended until the rule 10b-5 action is resolved.
CONCLUSION
Although the court in Diamond based its holding on the erroneous
premise that any use of confidential information acquired by an officer
or director of a corporation in the course of his duties is per se a
breach of the officer's or director's fiduciary duty, the result in the case
is nevertheless correct. The proper reason for upholding the defend-
ants' liability in Diamond is that the defendants placed themselves in
a position of conflict of interest with the corporation. Their personal
use of the information in selling MAI securities, although beneficial
to them, compromised the image and reputation of the corporation and
therefore constituted a breach of their fiduciary duty.
It has been shown that it is possible for an officer or director of
a corporation, by imprudent transactions in the securities of his cor-
poration, to violate not only the fiduciary duty owed to his corpora-
tion but also section 16(b) and rule lOb-5 simultaneously. Each viola-
tion gives rise to a distinct claim for the profits derived by the in-
sider from the prohibited transactions. However, triple liability should
not be imposed upon the defendant; the insider should be liable only
to the extent of the profits derived from the transactions. The threat
of double recovery by the corporation under agency law and section
16(b) is eliminated by Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 which limits the total recovery of any individual entitled to
sue under the Act to his actual damages, 82
 and by the fact that both
section 16(b) and agency theory limit recovery of the "profits"
of the defendant. 83
 There is likewise no possibility of double liability
created by the concurrent existence of agency law, section 16(b) and
rule 10b-5 actions, since plaintiff's claim to the defendant's profits
under rule 10b-5 is superior to the claim of the corporation under
agency law or section 16(b). Thus, if a rule 10b-5 claim is settled
prior to an agency or section 16(b) suit, the subsequent suit should
be dismissed since there are no "profits" to be recovered in the latter
suits, and since the deterrent policy which those latter suits were
intended to enforce has already been effectuated by the recovery under
rule 10b-5. In the reverse situation, where a successful rule 10b-5 claim
is brought subsequent to the corporation's recovery in an agency
or section 16(b) suit, the rule 10b-5 plaintiff would be allowed to
reach the profits recovered by the corporation because his claim
represents his actual damages, and is therefore superior to that of
the corporation which recovered the funds for the purpose of deter-
82 See pp. 509-10 supra.
ss See p. 510 supra.
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ring such actions on the part of corporate agents rather than as com-
pensation for any injury suffered.
ROGER P. KIRMAN
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